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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Defining the Parent's Duty After Rejection of
Parent-Child Immunity: Parental Liability for
Emotional Injury to Abandoned Children
I. INTRODUCTION
Child neglect and abandonment are serious problems in the
United States. The number of children in foster care in the United
States has risen from a third of a million in 19711 to over 750,000 in
1979.2 A significant number of these children have been abandoned
voluntarily and permanently by their parents.3 Abandoned children
suffer marked psychological consequences;5 even after receiving the
best available foster care, such children suffer adverse emotional
effects throughout their adult lives.' Due to the traditional Ameri-
can rule granting parents immunity from personal injury suits by
their minor children,7 abandoned children generally have been un-
compensated for these injuries. The recent trend toward abrogation
of parental immunity,8 however, suggests that the prospects for
abandoned children are likely to improve.
1. See SuBcoMM. ON CHILDREN AND YoUTH, SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WEL-
FARE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESs., FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTIONS: SOME KEY POLICY ISSUES 7 (Comm.
Print 1975).
2. See Abuse and Neglect of Children in Institutions, 1979: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 193-94 (1979) (statement of Arabella Martinez).
3. See Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 718, 588 P.2d 1105, 1113 (1978) (Lent, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part). In 1975, an estimated 30.6% of New York City children in
foster care or awaiting placement in foster homes were victims of "[p]arental unwillingness
to care for child, including desertion." B. BERNSTEIN, D. SNIDER & W. MEEZAN, NEW YORK
STATE BOARD OF SOCL WELFARE, FOSTER CARE NEEDS AND ALTERNATIvEs TO PLACEMENT: A
PROJECTION FOR 1975-1985, at 10-11 (1975), reprinted in Foster Care: Problems and Issues,
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare and the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-74 (1975).
4. For purposes of this Recent Development, "abandoned children" includes both aban-
doned and neglected children.
5. See V. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 21-22 (1973). Neglected children will
often exhibit such physical symptoms as untreated infections or malnutrition. Fontana, how-
ever, reports having seen abandoned children "who gave every appearance of being physically
healthy, yet looked terribly lost, and who never laughed and seldom cried." Id. at 22. See
generally Comment, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FOEDHAM L. RE v. 669, 716-
18 (1978).
6. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
32-34 (1973).
7. See notes 10-32 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 56-88 infra and accompanying text.
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After examining the history of parent-child immunity, this Re-
cent Development details the numerous judicial limitations and
exceptions that first signaled the doctrine's demise. This Recent
Development then analyzes the reasoning of jurisdictions that have
abrogated the rule and the problems faced by courts in determining
the scope of parents' liability absent the doctrine's protection. Fi-
nally, this Recent Development examines three possible bases of
recovery for emotional and physical injury when parents are not
immune from suit.
11. THE DEMISE OF PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY
A. A Brief History9
The notion that a minor child could not sue his parent in tort
originated in Hewlett v. George,'0 an action brought by a minor
daughter against her mother for false imprisonment in an insane
asylum. Reasoning that society's interest is best served by preserv-
ing peace in the family, the court held that a minor child could not
seek civil redress for personal injury against his parents." Several
years later, in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 2 the Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld dismissal of a suit by a minor child against his father
and stepmother for cruel and inhuman treatment. After noting that
a parent has the right to control his child, the court, without any
specific authority, attributed to common law the rule that a child
had no remedy if the parent abused this right. 3 In addition, the
9. For a detailed treatment of the rise and decline of the immunity rule, see Comment,
Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1967).
10. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The court cited no authority for this proposition. See
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 865 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, supra note 9, at 201.
11. 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887. The court referred to the parent's "obligation to care
for, guide and control" his child, but declined to enforce such obligation through civil law.
The court stressed that "Etihe state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child
protection from parental violence and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard to
demand." Id.
12. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
13. Id. at 390, 77 S.W. at 664. In fact, no reported English cases deal with suits by minor
children against parents. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 122, at 865. American authority is split
whether this silence means that such suits can or cannot be maintained. See Comment, supra
note 9, at 201 n.3. The McKelvey court cites Cooley, who states that if the parent, in his
exercise of authority,
plainly exceeds all bounds, he is liable to criminal prosecution, but it seems never to
have been held that the child might maintain a personal action for his injury. In princi-
ple there seems to be no reason why such an action should not be sustained; but the
policy of permitting actions that thus invite the child to contest the parent's authority
is so questionable, that we may well doubt if the right will ever be sanctioned.
T. CooLEY, LAw OF TORTS, 171 (1879), cited in 111 Tenn. at 390, 77 S.W. at 664. The court,
noting that Cooley cites no cases sustaining such actions, cites Hewlett for its own holding.
111 Tenn. at 390, 77 S.W. at 664. Interestingly, although the McKelvey court points out that
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court drew an analogy between the relationship of parent and child
and that of husband and wife, reasoning that the same policies
preventing a wife from suing her husband justify preventing a child
from suing his parent."
In Roller v. Roller'5 the Washington Supreme Court firmly es-
tablished the doctrine of parent-child immunity in American juris-
prudence. Plaintiff, a fifteen year old girl, brought a civil action
seeking damages for rape against her father, who had already been
criminally convicted of the same charges. The court dismissed the
action on the grounds that a minor child may not sue her parent in
tort." The court reasoned that to allow such actions would be
against public policy and would disrupt the tranquility of the house-
hold.'7 The court also expressed concern that it could draw no limi-
tation once it permitted action by a child against her parents; any
such action would have to be permitted, not only for "heinous
crime," but for any tort.'8 The court noted further that if a child
were to recover damages from a parent, the parent would become
heir to the judgment should the child die.' Finally, the court sug-
gested that one child should not appropriate the family estate at the
expense of other minor children in whose welfare the public has an
interest."
These three decisions "constitute the great trilogy upon which
the American rule of parent-child tort immunity is based." 2' They
include most of the reasons commonly given in support of the rule:
the concern for the preservation of the family unit;22 the preserva-
the right to control a child "grew out of the corresponding duty on [the father's] part to
maintain, protect and educate it," it refused, as did the court in Hewlett, to enforce this duty
in a civil action. Id.
14. Id. at 391, 77 S.W. at 665. But see W. PRossER, supra note 10, § 122, at 859, 865
(suggesting that such an analogy is improper in that parent and child, unlike husband and
wife, were never deemed at common law to be one person).
15. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 243-44, 79 P. at 788. The Roller court also cites Cooley, who asserts, without
the support of any case law,
that [f]or an injury suffered by the child in that relation no action will lie at the
common law. The obligation of the parent to support him is only enforced by proceedings
on behalf of the public, and not by suit in the name of or on behalf of the child.
T. COOLEY, LAw OF ToRTS 276 (2d ed. 1888), cited in 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
18. 37 Wash. at 244, 79 P. at 789.
19. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
20. Id.
21. Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband &
Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 182 (1961).
22. See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Mesite v. Kirchen-
stein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891);
Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388,
77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
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tion of parental authority;" the preservation of the family excheq-
uer;2 the assertion that the injured child already has a remedy in
criminal proceedings or in removal from his parents' custody; 5 the
suggested analogy between the relationship of husband and wife
and that of parent and child;" the possibility that the parent could
inherit any judgment that the child might recover;" and the possi-
bility that frivolous claims might flood the courts.2 A more recent
justification for the rule is the danger of fraud and collusion between
the parties in cases involving insurance.29
B. The Growth of Exceptions
The majority of American courts quickly adopted the immunity
rule3" and applied it to both intentional" and negligent 2 torts. These
courts, however, apparently displeased with the rule, also placed
limitations on the scope of immunity. For example, courts did not
extend immunity beyond personal torts and refused to adopt com-
parable immunity for contract or property actions." In addition,
several courts declined to apply the doctrine in tort cases involving
solely property damage, such as trespass, 4 or pecuniary loss, as in
most deceit cases." Also, most courts did not grant the parent im-
munity if the child was an adult or an emancipated minor," al-
23. See, e.g., Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Small v. Morrison,
185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388,77 S.W. 664 (1903);
Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
24. See, e.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
25. See, e.g., Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Hewlett v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675
(1939); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
26. See, e.g., McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 391, 77 S.W. 664, 665 (1903).
27. See, e.g., Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
28. See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
29. See, e.g., Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Barlow v. Iblings, 261
Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Ball v.
Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
30. See Comment, supra note 9, at 202 and cases cited therein.
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Cook v. Cook, 232
Mo. Apj. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939).
32. See, e.g., Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Hastings v.
Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771
(1964); Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wash. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966).
33. Comment, supra note 9, at 203.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G, Comment d (1977).
35. Id. But see Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924).
36. See, e.g., Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (1954); Farrar v. Farrar,
41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930). Plaintiff daughter in Hewlett had been married prior
to her cause of action, but was separated from her husband at the time. The court recognized
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though some courts invoked the doctrine if the child was an une-
mancipated minor at the time the tort was committed.37
In additon to these limitations, courts developed several excep-
tions to the immunity rule. One early exception permitted suits
against persons who stood in loco parentis. 3 The reason for this
exception, however, is not clear. One court suggested that the excep-
tion was simply an early retreat from the immunity doctrine;3 other
courts concluded that a person standing in loco parentis does not
have the same legal obligation to a child as does his natural parent."
Another exception arises when one or both parties to the action are
deceased.4 In such a case, the principal reason for the immunity
doctrine-the interest in preserving family harmony or parental dis-
cipline-is absent.2 Similarly, an exception to the immunity doc-
trine also exists in wrongful death actions." Again, the family unit
has been destroyed. Courts also reason that since wrongful death is
a statutory action, there should be no immunity when the statute
is silent on the issue.44
that if she had been emancipated by her marriage, her suit could be maintained, but declined
to assume that such was the case. 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887. The rationale for this exception
is that in the case of an adult child or emancipated minor the rights and duties of the parent
in the relationship have ended, and the harmony of the home no longer needs protection. Id.
37. See, e.g., Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M. 139, 420 P.2d 127 (1966).
38. E.g., Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901) (action to
recover damages for assault and battery allowed against plaintiff's stepmother). Accord,
Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) (action permitted against estate of
stepfather who poisoned adopted son); Cwik v. Zylstra, 58 N.J. Super. 29, 155 A.2d 277 (1959)
(suit permitted against grandparents standing in loco parentis). Contra, Bricault v. Deveau,
21 Conn. Supp. 486, 157 A.2d 604 (1960) (recognizing immunity for stepparent standing in
loco parentis).
39. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 122, at 865 (citing Treschman v. Treschman, 28
Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901)).
40. See Burdick v. Nawrocki, 21 Conn. Supp. 272, 154 A.2d 242 (1959) (stepfather not
under legal obligation to care for, guide, or control child when natural mother still living);
Rayburn v. Moore, 241 So. 2d 675 (Miss. 1970) (stepfather not under legal obligation to
support stepchild).
41. See, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311
(5th Cir. 1966) (applying Georgia law, action permitted against estate of deceased mother);
Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. 1970) (action by minor child permitted against
deceased father's estate). But see Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467 (1963).
42. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311, 316 (5th
Cir. 1966); Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (applying Pennsylvania
law and allowing suit by both minor son and widow of deceased).
Some courts deny a cause of action even though the parent is deceased. See Castellucci
v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 188 A.2d 467 (1963) (suggesting that it is the province of the
legislature to limit the immunity rule); Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940)
(holding that to allow such an exemption would encourage litigation by unemancipated
minors against the estates of deceased parents).
43. See, e.g., Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961); Shum-
way v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 107 N.W.2d 531 (1961).
44. See, e.g., Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963). But see note 22
supra.
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Several courts also recognize an exception when the tort is com-
mitted in connection with the parent's business activities." Courts
recognizing this exception emphasize that negligent acts in perform-
ance of employment or business are unrelated to the discharge of
parental responsibilities; thus a cause of action under such circum-
stances is less likely to disturb family harmony." An interesting
variation of this exception deals with "dual relationships"-when in
addition to the parent-child relationship, the parties may be charac-
terized as carrier and passenger 7 or master and servant." Courts
generally reason that if such a dual relationship exists, the domestic
relationship is incidental and therefore logically irrelevant to the
cause of action.4'
Another widely recognized exception to the immunity rule
holds that a third party is not protected from liability for the par-
ent's tort. For example, if the parent within the scope of his employ-
ment injures his child, the parent's employer will not be protected
from suit by the parent's immunity.
Finally, a particularly important exception permits suit against
parents who intentionally inflict injury upon their children5' or who
engage in willful misconduct.52 Courts adopting this exception gen-
erally reason that the parent has abandoned the parental relation
and therefore cannot claim parental immunity. 3 Certainly, in the
case of a particularly violent intentional tort, such as when a father
murders his wife and commits suicide in his child's presence,"
granting the father immunity from suit would not salvage the peace
and tranquility of the home.5
45. See, e.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 44 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
46. See Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151
Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963).
47. See Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
48. See Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966). But see Luster v. Luster,
299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938) (suggesting that a clear distinction between parental and
business duties is not possible).
49. See, e.g., Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966).
50. E.g., Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938).
51. See, e.g., Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (1959); Treschman
v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d
923 (1951).
52. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Oldman v. Bartshe,
480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971). But see Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375
(1966) (immunity even for negligent and willful misconduct, absent showing of actual intent
to injure child); Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wash. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966) (retaining immun-
ity for gross negligence of parent acting in parental capacity).
53. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
54. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
55. It is interesting to note that even though Maryland clings steadfastly to the immun-
[Vol. 33:775
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C. The Rejection of the Rule
The various limitations and exceptions to parental immunity
indicate an attempt by several courts to avoid unjust results while
still operating within the confines of the rule." In 1932, a Missouri
appellate court first attempted to abrogate the rule entirely,57 but
other courts did not follow the decision." It was not until 1963, with
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Golter v. White,5' that
the parental immunity doctrine was abrogated. The case involved
injury to a child whose father negligently allowed him to ride on the
drawbar of a tractor. To support its finding of liability, the court
pointed to the widespread judicial dissatisfaction with the rule as
evidenced by the numerous exceptions."0 Thus, the Wisconsin court
abolished the immunity doctrine except in certain limited circum-
stances,6' and a significant minority of jurisdictions have followed
its lead. "
ity doctrine, see Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568, cert. denied, 283 Md.
736 (1978), the Maryland Supreme Court nonetheless permitted recovery for mental injuries
accompanied by physical manifestations in Mahnke. See 197 Md. at 69, 77 A.2d at 926, 927.
56. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 122, at 867; RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS §
895G, Comment d (1977).
57. Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932).
58. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 895G, Comment j (1977).
59. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
60. Id. at 410, 122 N.W.2d at 197.
61. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. These exceptions are
"(1) [w]here the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over
the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary paren-
tal discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
services, and other care."
Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G, Comment j (1977).
62. In addition to Wisconsin, eleven states have abrogated the immunity, though
with varying degrees of enthusiasm. California has taken the most liberal position. In a case
involving the negligence of a father in instructing his son to correct the position of their towed
vehicle on a dark highway, the California Supreme Court rejected immunity without limita-
tion or exception and adopted a reasonable and prudent parent standard. See Gibson v.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
The remaining cases have uniformly involved physical injuries as a result of the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle. In this context, five states have rendered decisions similar in
breadth to Gibson, rejecting immunity without any particular limitation or exception:
Maine. Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Ne. 1979).
New Hampshire. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
New York. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1969).
Pennsylvania. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
Three other states have rejected immunity with Goller limitations:
Kentucky. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970).
Michigan. Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972).
Minnesota. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
The remaining three have rejected immunity with even more caution, not only adopting
Goller limitations, but reserving the question of a parent's liability in cases other than those
involving negligence in automobile accidents:
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The reasons for abrogation of the doctrine relate directly to the
reasons for the doctrine itself. One commentator has noted that the
immunity doctrine arose as the result of a balancing process be-
tween the abridgement of a child's rights and the benefits to the
child of a continuing family relationship. 3 The Second Restatement
of Torts, however, has suggested that any such benefits cannot out-
weigh "the more urgent desirability of compensating the injured
person, and particularly a child, for genuine harm which may crip-
ple him for life and ruin his entire future."" Several courts have
Alaska. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967).
Arizona. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970).
New Jersey. France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
In other jurisdictions that have permitted recovery by children in automobile injury cases
it is difficult to determine whether the holding constitutes abrogation as such or is merely
another of many exceptions. See, e.g., Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960);
Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971). Perhaps for this reason Illinois is
often cited, erroneously, as having abrogated immunity. See, e.g., Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa.
372, 379, 282 A.2d 351, 354 (1971) (citing Schenk v. Schenk, 100 111. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d
12 (1968)). In fact Illinois disclaims having done so. See Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844,
227 N.E.2d 779 (1972); Schenck v. Schenk, 100 11. App. 2d 199, 205-07, 241 N.E.2d 12, 14-15
(1968). Suffice it to say that these courts may be persuaded in future cases to limit their
"abrogation" to auto injury cases.
Three states-Hawaii, Nevada, and Vermont-never adopted the parent-child immunity
doctrine. See Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969);
Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191 (1977).
North Dakota has permitted recovery by child against parent based on a statute establish-
ing general liability for negligence. See Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967).
63. Comment, supra note 9, at 204.
64. The factor that apparently tipped the scales in favor of rejecting immunity is the
development of liability insurance. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 895G, Comment
c (1977). A number of courts that have permitted suits by child against parent, whether the
action is considered an exception to the otherwise accepted rule or a rejection of the rule
entirely, have discussed insurance in reaching their decisions. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435
P.2d 8, 13 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88-89, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970);
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971); Petersen
v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1969); Plumley v.
Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 7-8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 438-
42, 161 N.W.2d 631, 636-38 (1968); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015-17 (Nev. 1974);
Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (1966); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp.,
56 N.J. 500, 505, 267 A.2d 490, 493 (1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438-39, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529, 531-32, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94 (1969); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 379-81, 282
A.2d 351, 355-56 (1971); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 184-86, 183 S.E.2d 190, 193-95
(1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963). In a number of
actions by child against parent for personal injury torts, and especially in cases that involve
automobile negligence, see RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 895G, Comment c (1977), the
real party in interest is the defendant's personal liability insurer. Thus, a number of courts
rely on the possibility of fraud or collusion as justification for the immunity rule. See, e.g.,
note 29 supra. See generally Note, Intrafamily Tort Immunity in Virginia: A Doctrine in
Decline, 21 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 273 (1979).
Although states abrogating the immunity insist that the mere existence of liability insur-
ance does not itself create liability, see, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967),
two states permit recovery by the child to the extent of the parent's liability insurance. See
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rejected the rule because they no longer consider its justifications
compelling. One court has responded pragmatically to the argument
that to allow actions by children against parents will disturb family
harmony by noting that if such an action is brought at all there is
probably no domestic tranquility to be destroyed. 5 Alternatively, if
the case involves insurance, then family harmony will more likely
be disrupted if the court denies the action." In any event, the idea
that an uncompensated tort promotes family harmony appears un-
founded. 7 Indeed, it does not appear that family harmony would be
any more adversely affected by tort actions than by contract or
property actions." Thus, in view of cases allowing tort actions be-
tween other members of the family," the preservation of family
harmony is not a convincing reason for cutting off the rights of
children injured by their parents.
Similarly, the argument that to allow suit by children would
undermine parental authority is not adequate justification for par-
ental immunity. Rather, it is better to consider the merits of each
individual case than to protect parental authority with a blanket
immunity from suit.7" In this regard, courts have argued that the
possibility that children will cease to obey their parents if permitted
to sue them for assaults is remote.7' The immunity rule assumes
that, like a sovereign, a parent can do no wrong.72 In fact, a parent
is more like a judge-not accountable for mere errors, but responsi-
ble when he oversteps his bounds.73 Moreover, if the parent has, in
the exercise of his authority, injured his child so severely that an
action is brought, it would be unwise to protect summarily the
exercise of authority to the child's detriment.
Courts have also rejected the argument that to allow suit would
result in depletion of the family exchequer. 7' This argument cer-
tainly carries no weight if the defendant is insured. 75 In any event,
this rationale "ignores the parent's power to distribute his favors as
Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 339
N.E.2d 907 (1975).
65. See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 576, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
66. W. PRossER, supra note 10, § 122, at 868. See generally note 64 supra.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G, Comment c (1977).
68. See Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 576, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
69. See Comment, supra note 21, at 188 nn.197-204 and accompanying text.
70. See Comment, supra note 21, at 189.
71. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 362-63, 150 A. 905, 910 (1930).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See note 24 supra.




he will, and leaves out of the picture the depletion of the child's
assets of strength and health through the injury.""6 More-
over, under normal circumstances a parent would pay the costs of
any nontortious injury to his child. Thus, it is unlikely that abroga-
tion of the doctrine would significantly alter a family's financial
status.
The availability of criminal remedies also is not a convincing
argument for denying a private cause of action to an injured child.
Criminal remedies do not compensate a child for his damages.7
Moreover, it is unrealistic to believe that such proceedings will dis-
rupt family harmony any less than a tort action."
Analogizing parental immunity to spousal immunity also ap-
pears to be an insufficient reason for retention of the parental im-
munity doctrine. At common law husband and wife were considered
a legal unit; there was, however, no such unity between parent and
child.7 Moreover, the marital immunity itself has been subject to
considerable criticism; in fact, a number of states have abrogated
it."' Indeed, Prosser suggested that "[t]he height of inconsistency
is reached by [those] courts which permit action by the wife but
deny it to the child."'"
The argument that a parent might fall heir to judgment against
him in favor of his child is also not convincing." First, the possibility
of such an occurrence is remote, and second, to the extent that it
exists, the same could occur in a property case.3
Finally, the criticism that rejection of immunity for certain
serious torts logically would result in rejection for all torts also does
not justify retaining the parental immunity rule. Concededly, courts
inclined to permit actions between parent and child do not distin-
guish between intentional torts and negligent torts.8" The concern
that permitting all such actions will result in a flood of litigation,
however, is an insufficient rationale for immunity. Indeed, the
76. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930).
77. Comment, supra note 21, at 192. See also Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 730, 588
P.2d 1105, 1119 (1978) (Linde, J., dissenting).
78. Comment, supra note 21, at 192. See also Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 730, 588
P.2d 1105, 1119 (1978) (Linde, J., dissenting).
79. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 353, 150 A. 905, 905-06 (1930).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 895G (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972) and cases
cited therein.
81. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 122, at 865 n.75 (citing Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark.
832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938)); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Redding
v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787
(1927)).
82. See Comment, supra note 9, at 205.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967).
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American Law Institute has observed that "[tihis seems a poor
reason for denying liability for real harm to a child, which ought to
be compensated. . . . It is the business of the courts to deal with
the flood of actions if they arise. '8 5 Similarly, with regard to the
concern over fraud and collusion between parent and child, courts
should inquire into the possibility of such fraud and collusion in
individual cases rather than bar all suits by children against their
parents."' The possibility of fraud or collusion is no greater in tort
actions between parent and child than in other actions generally
permitted by the courts, such as contract or property suits between
parent and child, or suits between driver and guest or master and
servant.'7
Because of the less than compelling reasons for retaining
parent-child immunity, a growing minority of courts have abrogated
the doctrine. Significantly, in response to this trend the American
Law Institute has also rejected parent-child immunity in the Sec-
ond Restatement of Torts." The abrogation of parental immunity
raises some important questions regarding the extent to which par-
ents will be held liable for tortious injury to their children.
I. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF PARENTAL Lumrry: Burnette v. Wahl
AND THE ATTEMPT TO RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL INJURY
In Burnette v. Wahl" a sharply divided Oregon Supreme Court
attempted to define the limits of parental liability in the wake of
Oregon's foresaken parent-child immunity rule. Burnette was an
action brought by minor children, through their guardian, against
their mothers seeking damages for emotional and psychological in-
juries caused by the alleged failure of defendants to perform their
parental duties." These duties, according to the complaint, in-
cluded a general obligation to "provide plaintiff with care, custody,
parental nurturance, affection, comfort, companionship, support,
regular contact and visitation."" More specifically, plaintiffs ac-
cused defendants of violating Oregon criminal statutes that prohib-
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 702A, at 26 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969). This
section refers to the liability of persons who induce a parent to leave his minor child.
86. See RESTATEMET (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 895G, Comment c.
87. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 122, at 865-66; Comment, supra note 21, at 192.
88. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 895G.
89. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
90. Plaintiffs, wards of the Klamath County Juvenile Court, were in the custody of the
Children's Services Division of the Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon.
Three identical actions brought by their guardian ad litem, the Portland Metropolitan Public
Defender, were consolidated for appeal.
91. 284 Or. at 707, 588 P.2d at 1107.
19801
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:775
ited parents from abandoning,"2 neglecting,93 or failing to support
their children."1 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs'
claims, holding that neither these statutes nor the common law
provide a civil remedy for the wrongs alleged.'5 The disparate opin-
ions in Burnette offer evidence of the difficulty courts are likely to
face in determining the scope of parents' liability to their children.
Justice Holman's majority opinion focused upon the lack of
legislative authority for such suits" and suggested that to allow a
cause of action would upset a complex legislative scheme designed
to deal with the problems of child abuse, neglect, aid abandon-
ment.'" These statutes, according to Justice Holman, expressed a
legislative policy of reuniting the family when possible." Justice
Holman feared that to allow a cause of action based on these stat-
utes would interfere with the state's effort to restore the family."
Moreover, for the same reasons, he refused to create a new tort of
parental desertion.'0 Justice Tongue concurred in the result, stating
more directly, however, that the doctrine of parental immunity
should not be abandoned with respect to liability for mental and
emotional injuries.' 1
92. OR. REv. STAT. § 163.535 (1977) states:
Abandonment of a child. (1) A person commits the crime of abandonment of a child
if, being a parent, lawful guardian or other person lawfully charged with the care or
custody of a child under 15 years of age, he deserts the child in any place with intent to
abandon it.
(2) Abandonment of a child is a Class C felony.
93. OR. REv. STAT. § 163.545 (1977) states:
Child neglect. (1) A person having custody or control of a child under 10 years of
age commits the crime of child neglect if, with criminal negligence, he leaves the child
unattended in or at any place for such period of time as may be likely to endanger the
health or welfare of such child.
(2) Child neglect is a Class A misdemeanor.
94. OR. Rzv. STAT. § 109.010 (1977) states that "[plarents are bound to maintain their
children who are poor and unable to work to maintain themselves; and children are bound
to maintain their parents in like circumstances." OR. RV. STAT. § 163.555 (1977) states:
Criminal nonsupport. (1) A person commits the crime of criminal nonsupport if,
being the parent, lawful guardian or other person lawfully charged with the support of
a child under 18 years of age, born in or out of wedlock, he refuses or neglects without
lawful excuse to provide support for such child.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a Class C felony.
In addition, plaintiffs alleged alienation of affections as a result of the stated failures and
violations. The court summarily dealt with this allegation by noting that the legislature had
abolished this particular tort. See OR. REv. STAT. § 30-840 (1977).
95. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105.
96. Id. at 710, 588 P.2d at 1108-09.
97. Id. at 712, 588 P.2d at 1109.
98. Id. at 712, 588 P.2d at 1109-10.
99. Id. at 714, 588 P.2d at 1110-11.
100. Id. at 717, 588 P.2d at 1112.
101. Id.
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Justice Lent, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
with the result only because plaintiffs failed technically in their
pleadings to state a cause of action for "outrageous conduct."'' 2 He
insisted, however, that the court should permit a civil cause of ac-
tion for damages upon a properly drafted complaint.03 Justice Lent
examined the costs of caring for abandoned children, including both
the monetary loss to the community"' and the "loss of human po-
tential" caused by psychological and emotional harm to abandoned
children,1is and concluded that offending parents "should shoulder
so much of the burden as [their] resources permit."' 5
In his dissent, Justice Linde noted that it is not uncommon for
courts to award civil damages for violations of prohibitory laws"'
and concluded that parents could be held liable for mental and
emotional damages inflicted maliciously, intentionally, and with
cruel disregard of the consequences."' Justice Linde insisted that
the majority's desire to protect the legislative policy of preserving
family unity would preclude suits for torts resulting in physical as
well as mental injury.'" Finally, the dissent accused Justice Holman
of applying the doctrine of parent-child immunity even though Ore-
gon courts had abandoned the doctrine with respect to intentional
torts.""
Although Justice Holman did not attempt to embrace the im-
munity doctrine as the basis for his decision, his concern that there
could be no limitation on a parent's liability to his child for purely
emotional injuries is reminiscent of the rationale traditionally prof-
fered to justify immunity. Justice Holman observed that "[t]here
are probably as many children who have been damaged in some
manner by their parents' failure to meet completely their physical,
emotional and psychological needs as there are people.""' The court
suggested, as an example of the high exposure of parents to liability
for emotional injuries, that a child might sue his parents for emo-
102. Id. at 717, 588 P.2d at 1112 (Lent, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
accord, RzSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 46 (1965) (Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe
Emotional Distress).
103. 284 Or. at 717, 588 P.2d at 1112.
104. Id. at 719, 588 P.2d at 1113.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 723, 588 P.2d at 1115.
107. Id. at 724, 588 P.2d at 1116 (Linde, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 729, 588 P.2d at 1118 (Linde, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 730, 588 P.2d at 1118 (Linde, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 731, 588 P.2d at 1118 (Linde, J., dissenting); see Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or.
282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
111. 284 Or. at 716, 588 P.2d at 1111. Cf. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 244, 79 P. 788,
789 (1905) (suggesting that if a suit against a parent by a child for the "heinous crime" of
rape were permitted, no distinction for other torts could be made).
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tional damages resulting from the parents' divorce on the theory
that reasonable persons would conclude that harm was substan-
tially certain to result from such an act."2 Justice Holman's reason-
ing sounds very much like the rationale generally offered to justify
parental immuity-that the abrogation of immunity would result in
a flood of frivolous litigation. Indeed, Justice Tongue went so far as
to argue that such immunity should be preserved for claims alleging
emotional injury. Thus, Burnette vividly illustrates the principal
difficulty courts are likely to face when attempting to place limita-
tions upon parental liability after they have abandoned the immun-
ity doctrine. Even though parental immunity has been abandoned,
such courts must face the same considerations that couched the
immunity-no immunity debate. As a result, the rationale that a
court must use for limiting parental liability in a particular context
will likely be the same rationale that the court rejected when it
abandoned parental immuity in the first place. Justice Linde's dis-
sent apparently recognized this inconsistency when it noted that the
majority's rationale for precluding suits for emotional injury, if logi-
cally applied, would also preclude suits for physical injury.
IV. PARENTAL LiBnrry FOR CHILD NEGLECT AND ABANDONMENT
The Burnette case illustrates the analytic problems in barring
suits for mental and emotional injuries in jurisdictions that have
abrogated the parent-child immunity doctrine or have adopted cer-
tain of the widely recognized exceptions to the rule."' It seems in-
congruous for any jurisdiction that has accepted the arguments for
rejection of immunity to refuse to entertain claims alleging mental
and emotional injury. If such a jurisdiction accepts the general prin-
ciple that it is possible to inflict mental or emotional injury, either
intentionally or recklessly,"' and if the jurisdiction recognizes that
such injury may cause economic consequences as serious as do phys-
ical injuries,"' then by allowing only claims for physical injury, the
jurisdiction leaves a particular class of children uncompensated
without justification. Analytic consistency requires that these juris-
dictions permit recovery for emotional injury as well as for physical
injury. The demise of parental immunity has made any distinction
between the two logically impossible. Rather than focus on the na-
112. 284 Or. at 716, 588 P.2d at 1111.
113. This dilemma exists in states that permit suits for intentional torts based on the
rationale that the defendant parent may have abandoned the parental relation. See notes 51-
55 supra and accompanying text.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46 (1965).
115. See W. PRossER, supra note 10, § 12, at 50-51.
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ture of the child's injury, courts in these jurisdictions should focus
on whether the parent has a duty to the child and whether that duty
has been breached."16
A. Statutes as Defining Parental Duty
Since each of the fifty states has laws prohibiting child neglect,
abuse, or abandonment,"7 it is possible for courts to define parental
duties by reference to these statutes.I s Courts often adopt the stan-
dard of conduct set forth in a penal statute as the standard of
conduct required of a reasonable and prudent person in negligence
cases."' In addition, statutes have been held to define a defendant's
duty for other torts.'2" Thus, a court might construe a statute which
provides that
[any adult person who willfully causes or permits a child who is less than 18
years of age to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a re-
sult of abuse or neglect or who willfully causes or permits a child to be placed
in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as
a result of abuse or neglect is guilty of a gross misdemeanor'
as creating a duty in a parent not to neglect willfully a child so as
to cause the child mental distress. The court could then elect to
enforce this duty by granting a civil remedy for its violation.
When a criminal child neglect statute neither expressly pro-
vides civil remedies for its violation nor expressly prohibits such
remedies, courts may attempt to determine whether the legislature
intended a civil remedy.12 If the court is unable to find an express
116. See Comment, supra note 9, at 219. The article opines that jurisdictions abrogating
the immunity without reservation may find it necessary to limit these decisions or face suits
by children that, for example, charge their parents with negligently failing to have the child's
cavity filled. Id. It seems possible, and indeed preferable, however, to define a parent's duty
to his child in such a way as to limit a parent's exposure to actions, rather than to retain any
notion of immunity. See notes 140-42 infra and accompanying text.
117. 46 FoRDHA L. REv. at 720. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-807 to -818 (1977);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-21, -23 (1979); NEV. Rav. STAT.
§ 200.508 (1977). See also Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM.
L.Q. 1 (1975).
118. See RESTATEmENT (SE cOND) OF ToRrs § 874A.
119. See, e.g., Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543 (1889); Stachniewicz
v. Mar-Cam Corp., 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436 (1971); W. PRossaa, supra note 10, § 36.
120. "[Sltatutory provisions have been accepted by the courts as a basis for civil
liability in actions for torts other than negligence, such as trespass, deceit, nuisance, or even
strict liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 286, Comment d (1965).
121. Nay. Rav. STAT. § 200.508 (1977).
122. The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes that there are three possible reasons for
a statute's silence as to civil remedies. First, the legislature may have intended civil liability
to be imposed, but failed to include a private cause of action. Second, the legislature may
have intended no civil liability. Third, the legislature may not have considered the possibility
of civil remedies at all. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 874A, Comment c (1977).
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or an implied private remedy in the statute, it is under no compul-
sion to apply the statute to create civil liability for defendant's
conduct.' 3 Nevertheless, the court is at liberty to do so if it deter-
mines that a civil remedy would promote the policy underlying the
statute;124 the court's inquiry is whether a tort remedy is first, con-
sistent with the statute and second, necessary for assuring its effec-
tiveness.'1 The court might also take into account the adequacy of
existing remedies,1 2 the extent to which a tort action would supple-
ment or interfere with existing remedies and enforcement, 27 the
burden that the new cause of action might place on the judicial
machinery,' 8 the extent of the change in tort law, and whether the
particular facts resemble existing torts or extend the scope of a tort
in a desirable direction. 2
The advantage of relying on statutes to define parental duty lies
in its relative simplicity; the legislature has already considered the
policy questions involved and prohibited certain conduct. Similarly,
a court relying on an abandonment statute to define a parent's civil
duty might argue that the existence of the criminal duty is evidence
that society has recognized the importance of deterring the conduct
in question. 3 ' In addition, a cause of action based upon a statute
provides built-in limitations upon the parent's liability. For exam-
ple, the court can look to precedents in criminal cases for guidance
in determining what actions constitute violation of the civil duty.
Certain problems arise, however, when courts attempt to apply
statutory standards of conduct to civil cases. As previously noted,
courts are under no particular obligation to apply these standards.'
Thus, it is possible that their application will not be uniform. An-
123. Id.; W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 36, at 191.
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 874A, Comment d (1977); see Phoenix Rev. Co.
v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892, 896-97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). Prosser calls this practice of promot-
ing the policy of a statute "something in the nature of judicial legislation." W. PROSSER, supra
note 10, § 36, at 191.
125. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 39 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975).
126. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78 (suggesting an examination of the entire legislative
scheme in order to ascertain the underlying policy). Cf. Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588
P.2d 1105 (1978); notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A, Comment h (1977).
128. Id. But see W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 12, at 51, noting that the possibility that
a large number of trivial actions might ensue
is a poor reason for denying recovery for any genuine, serious mental injury. It is the
business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a "flood of
litigation," and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of
justice to deny relief on such grounds.
129. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 874A, Comment h (1977).
130. See Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 728, 588 P.2d 1105, 1118 (1978).
131. See note 123 supra.
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other disadvantage of applying statutory standards of conduct is
that they can be quite inflexible. While a prosecutor can decide on
a case-by-case basis whether to prosecute depending on the facts,"'
courts have no such discretion. If a plaintiff is able to show that he
is a member of the class that the statute is designed to protect, that
the defendant violated the statute, and that the plaintiff was
thereby injured, then he will establish his case.'33 Furthermore, be-
cause it is unlikely that the legislature considered the existence of
civil remedies when it established the standard,3 ' a court cannot be
blamed for refusing to establish such remedies based on that stan-
dard. It is unlikely, therefore, that liability per se will be widely
adopted as a theory of recovery for abandoned children.'35
B. Common Law Torts
The voluntary and permanent abandonment of a child by his
parents might be said to constitute a violation of the parents' duty
not to cause severe emotional distress by intentionally or recklessly
engaging in extreme and outrageous conduct. 3 ' The tort of mental
distress would be particularly appropriate for dealing with child
abandonment because "[t]he extreme and outrageous nature of
the conduct may arise not so much from what is done as from abuse
by the defendant of some relation or position which gives him actual
or apparent power to damage the plaintiff's interests."'37 Although
this statement refers generally to affirmative acts such as extortion
or excessive methods of debt collection, a court could reason that a
parent is in a unique position to inflict severe mental distress upon
his child.
Precisely because the parent is in such a unique position to
affect his child's interest, the parent would be especially vulnerable
to liability unless some practical limitation is placed upon that
liability. For this reason, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goller v.
132. See 284 Or. at 714, 588 P.2d at 1110.
133. See, e.g., Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp., 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436 (1971).
134. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
135. There may be some question as to the constitutionality of child neglect statutes
in their present form. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Scope of State Child
Neglect Statutes, 79 COLUM. L. Rav. 719 (1979). Interference with family relationships may
be a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 722-27. In
addition, they may be unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 732. If these contentions are valid,
then the very features that make statutes attractive as a basis of civil liability may disappear
as these statutes are made more specific and therefore more rigid in application. Further,
legislatures may be precluded from specifically providing civil remedies for children because
these remedies would be an interference with domestic relations.
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToTS § 46 (1965).
137. W. PRosSaa, supra note 10, § 12, at 56.
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White'38 elected to retain parental immunity for the "exercise of
parental authority" and "parental discretion with respect to the
provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services and
other care."' 9 It can be argued, however, that although a parent has
discretion to decide what form and manner these services shall take,
he has no discretion not to provide them at all.
A sense of dissatisfaction arises from the Gotler limitations.4 '
As discussed in Part III, courts must find a better way to limit the
potential liability of parents than to retain the shreds of the tattered
immunity rule. The American Law Institute suggests that a particu-
lar act or omission on the part of a parent may be privileged and
thus not tortious."' This limitation would apply, for example, to
"[flamily romping, even roughhouse play and momentary flares of
temper not producing serious hurt."'' In addition, the Goller limita-
tions may be unnecessary because the majority of incidents result
in minor injuries and thus would not lead to a civil action. For
example, the unsupervised child who falls and scrapes his knee will
have his wound attended by the parent and the damage will be
negligible. Even more serious accidental injuries will normally be
recompensed by the parent or his insurance. Also, in cases that are
ultimately litigated, the plaintiff child must meet his burdens of
proof" 3 and causation.' Thus, the trier of fact can always find that
the defendant-parent did not violate the standard of conduct re-
quired of a reasonable and prudent parent. 5
Although the common law tort of mental distress may provide
abandoned children with a remedy for their emotional injuries, the
problems that courts might encounter in ascertaining its limits may
discourage reliance upon it.' Nevertheless, courts that reject par-
ental immunity must recognize its theoretical application.
138. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
139. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
140. The draft of the Restatement refers to the limitations as "dicta" and suggests that
parental authority is more properly characterized as a privilege and that parental discretion
involves no breach of duty and thus no tort. RSTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 895H, Note
2, at 82 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(2) (1977).
142. Id. Comment k at 430.
143. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 10, §§ 37-40.
144. See generally id. §§ 41-45.
145. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971);
Hansen v. Hansen, 5 FAi. L. REP. (BNA) 2516 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 29, 1979).
146. See Bumette v. Wahl, 284 Or. at 716, 588 P.2d at 1111 (raising the possibility that
children might have a cause of action for the reckless infliction of mental distress as a result
of their parents' divorce).
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C. A New Tort of Abandonment
A court may create a new tort in order to vindicate rights, either
because the court believes a statute requires a civil remedy to assure
its effectiveness or because it wishes to protect an interest that it
deems sufficiently important.'47 For example, a court might under-
take to create a new tort of abandonment either to protect the
interests of children in the absence of other remedies or to enhance
the enforcement of already existing child abandonment statutes."8
The advantage of creating a new tort of abandonment is that
the parent's duty could be carefully defined so as to avoid the possi-
bility of limitless liability for parents."' Moreover, a judicially cre-
ated tort remedy would be more flexible than a statutorily based
remedy; rather than place defendants into categories of liability or
nonliability based upon violation or nonviolation of a statute,'50 a
court could examine the merits of individual cases and provide a
remedy appropriate either to the reunification of the family or to
compensation of the child. The problem with the judicial creation
of a new tort, however, is that a court might be accused of overstep-
ping its authority by being too active in such a controversial field
as intrafamily relationships; the legislature, as a deliberative body,
is more suited to conducting the sort of policy analysis needed for
social engineering.'"'
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to 1963, when states began to reject the doctrine of im-
munity between parent and child, a minor child could not sue his
parent for damages resulting from mental and emotional injuries.
This left a large number of abandoned children to bear the emo-
tional scars of childhoods spent in foster homes even though states
simultaneously recognized the right of physically abused children to
recover damages for their injuries.
Today, with increased rejection of the parental immunity rule,
courts have the opportunity to mitigate the damage caused by child
abandonment and to impose a duty of emotional as well as physical
care upon parents for the well-being of their children. Courts that
reject or severely limit the immunity doctrine will soon confront
claims of children who have suffered mental injury as a result of
147. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A, Comment f (1977).
148. The Burnette court was asked to create a new tort of parental desertion, but
declined the invitation. 284 Or. at 717, 588 P.2d at 1112.
149. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
150. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
151. See 284 Or. at 715, 588 P.2d at 1111.
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parental abandonment. To protect the interests of these children,
courts should utilize the following theories of liability: liability per
se for violation of statute, liability for mental distress or negligence,
or possibly a new tort theory of liability for child abandonment. In
defining parental duty under whatever theory it pursues, a court
must consider the parent's exposure to potentially limitless liability
while nonetheless assuring that the parent assume appropriate re-
sponsibility.
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